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Economic Foundations of the Current 
Regulatory Reform Efforts 
W. Kip Viscusi 
raditional economic regulation focused on issues such as antitrust and 
setting prices for public utilities. But in the last few decades, the emerging 
role of environmental and risk regulation has transformed the role of reg- 
ulation in the American economy. Rough estimates of the economic costs of gov- 
ernment regulations exceed $500 billion (Hopkins, 1992). This total can be divided 
up in various ways. More than half the cost is attributable to paperwork require- 
ments arising out of regulation, but there is also more than $200 billion in direct 
costs of regulation, including costs to business. More than half of this amount is 
due to environmental regulation, and much of the remainder is attributable to 
various forms of risk regulation. About $100 billion involves government transfers, 
such as the effects of the minimum wage, while the rest involves costs paid by 
businesses. Regulatory benefits reduce the net burden of these efforts on society, 
but there are no good estimates of the total of regulatory benefits. 
Regulatory interventions often have a sound economic foundation. Many econ- 
omists would agree that markets have a difficult time spontaneously organizing to 
address all forms of environmental pollution and that consumers are unable to 
assess the risks associated with, say, prescription drugs. However, the existence of a 
rationale for some sort of government intervention in no way eliminates the need 
for obtaining the greatest benefit to society that can be derived from these regu- 
latory expenditures. 
During 1995 and 1996, the 104th Congress has considered a flurry of bills 
intended to foster more cost-effective regulatory policies by imposing greater 
*W Kip Viscusi is John Cogan, Jr., Professor of Law and Economics, Harvard Law School, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
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structure on risk and environmental regulations.' These legislative efforts were 
quite broad in scope; it's fair to say that they attempted to revolutionize the criteria 
for approval of government regulations. For example, rather than cleaning up haz- 
ardous waste sites whenever hazardous chemicals are present, irrespective of the 
costs involved and whether any populations are actually exposed to the risk, the 
new legislative proposals were intended to require the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) to assess the risks and to show that the social benefits of these actions 
exceeded the associated costs. 
The need for economic balancing is inevitable in a world of constrained re- 
sources. Suppose that we were to devote the entire U.S. gross domestic product to 
the prevention of fatal accidents. Even then, we would be only able to spend $55 
million per fatality (Viscusi, 1992, p. 5). That expenditure would leave literally 
nothing for other goods, such as other risks or environmental pollution, let alone 
basics like food, housing and medical care. Unless mechanisms exist for placing 
bounds on our risk reduction efforts, we can end up pursuing policies of diminish- 
ing marginal impact and diverting resources from more productive uses. 
A frequent approach of government regulations is to eliminate fatality risks 
that are one in a million annually or greater.2 But risks of this magnitude are ubiq- 
uitous. Death risks of one in a million are incurred every time we have one chest 
x-ray, live two days in New York or Boston (air pollution), travel 10 miles by bicycle, 
eat 40 tablespoons of peanut butter (cancer from aflatoxin B) or drink Miami 
drinking water for one year.3 If agencies devote their efforts to eliminating trivial 
risks of this magnitude, they are likely to be missing opportunities for policies that 
could be of much greater benefit. 
It is interesting to consider why current governmental efforts do not already 
put the design of regulations on a sounder footing. Why is a reform even needed 
to influence the guidelines for promulgating regulation? Why are agencies not 
more balanced? What can the possible objections be to legislation that would foster 
greater balance in the design of governmental regulatory efforts? Put somewhat 
differently, is the recent impetus for establishing economic criteria to assess regu- 
lations simply a disciplinary concern of economists or does it, in fact, have substan- 
tive implications for the design of regulatory policy? Surely, the spirited nature of 
the policy debate, the fact that no consensus regulatory reform bill has yet been 
passed by both houses of Congress, and the threat of a presidential veto tend to 
imply that issues of importance are at stake here. 
This article will review the process by which legislative mandates give regulatory 
' All subsequent discussion of House and Senate bills will refer to those introduced in the 104th Congress. 
In March 1995, the House of Representatives inserted the regulatory reform bill H.R. 1022 into another 
piece of legislation, H.R. 9, which was passed. 
2 The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and EPA, for example, target lifetime risks of 1 in 100,000 
which, over a 70-year assumed lifetime, are actually much smaller than 1 in a million. In the case of the 
EPA Superfund program, cleanup is mandatory for lifetime cancer risks in excess of l0' and discre- 
tionary for risks between l0' and 10'. 
3See Wilson (1979) for a more comprehensive tally of one in a million risks. 
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agencies the power to promulgate regulations. I will argue that regulatory reforms 
that place the assessment of regulation on sounder footing and incorporate un- 
biased risk assessment practices can potentially enhance the performance of regu- 
latory policies. 
Legislative Mandates 
Congress does not typically promulgate government regulations, with a few 
rare exceptions. Instead, Congress establishes broad legislative guidelines for reg- 
ulatory policy that define the objectives that should be promoted by regulations 
that will be issued by the various regulatory agencies within the executive branch. 
These regulatory agencies in turn propose regulations that go through a rule- 
making process in which there is both a review by the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB) as well as a public comment period, after which the agency can 
issue the regulation. In some instances, there is the threat that Congress will cut 
back funding if certain undesirable regulations are enacted. 
The primary check on reckless regulatory policymaking is that if a regulation 
fails to be consistent with the legislative mandate defined by Congress, it can be 
challenged in court. However, judicial challenges or other reviews cannot overturn 
the legislative mandate itself (unless the mandate is unconstitutional) regardless of 
how restrictive it is. The Clean Air Act, for example, specifically excludes the con- 
sideration of costs in EPA's setting of national ambient air quality standards. Simi- 
larly, in its regulation of prescription drugs, the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) must ascertain the safety and efficacy of these products, but there is no 
overall benefit-cost test that must be met either by the drugs themselves or by the 
drug approval process. Since many useful drugs apparently become available more 
quickly to patients in western Europe, concern has been expressed that the U.S. 
drug approval process may be too cumbersome and cautious. 
The principal judicial battleground over the breadth or narrowness of legis- 
lative mandates has involved the regulations of the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (OSHA). The legislative mandate of that agency has a safety- 
oriented character that is typical of other risk and environmental agencies. In par- 
ticular, the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 mandates the agency "to 
assure so far as possible every man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful 
working conditions."4 Other language in the bill mandates that OSHA undertake 
actions to protect workers against health hazards as far as is "feasible." The agency 
has interpreted these mandates in a very aggressive fashion, claiming there is no 
obligation to show that there is any relation between the benefits derived from the 
policies and the cost. Put somewhat differently, any risk reduction is justified as 
long as it reduces risk, regardless of how cosdly or inefficient it may be. 
4 Section 26 of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. ?651 (1976). 
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Not surprisingly, this agency interpretation has been the subject of several 
major court cases, which in turn have influenced other agencies' interpretation of 
their own legislative mandates. In a 1980 decision involving the OSHA benzene 
standard, the U.S. Supreme Court sidestepped the benefit-cost tradeoff issue but 
did assess OSHA's risk mandate. In particular, before promulgating a regulation, 
the Court ruled that OSHA was required to demonstrate that the standard would 
generate significant reductions in risk and that the standard would be "reasonably 
necessary or appropriate to provide safe and healthful employment." The Court 
concluded that promoting safety was not the same as eliminating all risks, however 
small: "But 'safe' is not the equivalent of 'risk-free.' A workplace can hardly be 
considered 'unsafe' unless it threatens the worker with significant risk of harm."5 
The requirement to show that the risk reduction is "significant" is also intertwined 
with how the agency assesses the risk, which is one of the principal concerns of the 
regulatory reform bills. 
In 1981, the U.S. Supreme Court considered the balancing issue with respect 
to the OSHA cotton dust regulation. One possible avenue for inserting economic 
tradeoff concerns would be to interpret the legislative requirements that OSHA 
regulations be "feasible" in terms of whether there is a sensible balance between 
the risks reduced and the money spent. However, the Court rejected this broader 
economic interpretation of feasibility and instead interpreted the agency's legisla- 
tive mandate in terms of whether there is the technical possibility of compliance 
("capable of being done") rather than meeting a benefit-cost test.6 
However, a more recent decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals would open the 
door for potential use of a benefit-cost test. Although the act in no way requires a 
benefit-cost test, the court indicated that OSHA was not foreclosed from undertak- 
ing some kind of benefit-cost balancing in promulgating its regulations. Moreover, 
the Court went so far as to oudline a new methodology of risk-risk analysis, which 
will be discussed below.7 
These few cases aside, however, the courts have deferred to the agency's dis- 
cretion in interpreting its legislative mandate. The pivotal court decision establish- 
ing this point was a 1984 case in which the Natural Resources Defense Council 
challenged EPA's introduction of the "bubble" policy, which would judge a firm's 
emissions from the standpoint of an artificial bubble around the plant rather than 
on a smokestack-by-smokestack basis. The bubble policy enables firms to select the 
most cost-effective emissions sources to control at a plant. The Supreme Court ruled 
that courts should permit agencies to interpret ambiguities in their legislative man- 
dates reasonably.8 Armed with these court rulings, regulatory agencies have had 
considerable discretion. 
5 See the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Industrial Union Department, AFLCIO v Amenican Petroleum 
Institute, 448 U.S. 607 (1980). 
6 See the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Amenican Textile Manufacturer's Institute v Donovan, 452 
U.S. 490 (1981). 
7 See UAWv Occupational Safety & Health Administration 938 F.2d 1310 (D.C. Circuit 1991). 
8 Chevron USA Inc. v NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
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Regulatoxy Oversight 
Since the Ford administration, there has been a formal regulatory oversight 
mechanism to provide a check on ill-chosen regulation. The Office of Management 
and Budget has been responsible for this activity since the Reagan administration. 
These oversight groups have been responsible for implementing executive orders 
with respect to regulatory criteria. In the Carter administration, these criteria re- 
quired that regulations be cost-effective and that the agency quantify the benefits 
and costs of the regulation.9 However, this effectiveness test did little to screen out 
inefficient regulations since truly dominant regulatory alternatives that were not 
selected could be identified in only a few cases. The more usual case is one in which 
the costs greatly exceeded the benefits by any usual economic measure, but there 
are no alternatives that provide exactly the same or more benefits at less cost. 
Since the Reagan administration, regulations have also been required by ex- 
ecutive order to show that the benefits of the regulation exceed the costs.'0 The 
Clinton administration has continued this policy, but emphasizes that this compar- 
ison should also recognize that not all benefits can be quantified in monetary 
terms." However, this benefit-cost test provision is applicable only if it does not 
conflict with the agency's legislative mandate. The risk and environmental agencies 
invariably interpret their legislative mandate as excluding a formal benefit-cost bal- 
ancing, using the Supreme Court decision in the cotton dust case and related cases 
to bolster their position. The result has been that the regulatory oversight effort 
has been restricted to generating marginal improvements in regulations and elim- 
inating some of the very worst regulations. However, some agencies continue to 
issue many regulations that economists would judge to be inefficient, while other 
agencies may not be doing enough. A reallocation of regulatory priorities would 
be beneficial. 
Tables 1 and 2 summarize the cost per life saved (with normal life expectancy) 
of a variety of regulations. These estimates do not, however, include all regulatory 
benefits, only the mortality effects that are typically the primaryjustification for the 
regulation. Suppose we take as our reference point an implicit value of life of $5 
million as the cutoff for an efficient regulation. This value is midway in the range 
of labor market estimates of value of a statistical life, which cluster from $3 million 
to $7 million, and should be a reasonable estimate of society's willingness to pay to 
avert a statistical death (Viscusi, 1993). By this standard, Table 1 shows regulations 
that have, in fact, met a benefit-cost test, while Table 2 lists some that have not. 
Most noteworthy is that all regulations in Tables 1 and 2 that were issued by 
9 The Carter effort was defined by Executive Order 12044, March 23, 1978 (Carter, 1979). The principal 
precursor was the Ford Executive Order 11821, November 27, 1974 (Ford, 1974). 
` Executive Order 12291, February 17, 1981, was the pivotal action that led to the adoption of the benefit- 
cost approach (Reagan, 1982). 
" The Clinton Executive Order No. 12866, issued September 30, 1993, broadened the definition of 
benefits to emphasize the nonmonetary character of many effects (Clinton, 1993). 
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Table 1 
The Cost of Risk-Reducing Regulations That Pass a Benefit-Cost Test 
Per Life Saved 
Cost Per 
Agency Initial Annual Life Saved 
Year and Annual Lives (Millions 
Regulation Status Risk Saved of 1984 $) 
Unvented Space CPSC 
Heaters 1980 F 2.7 in 105 63.000 $ .10 
Oil & Gas Well Service OSHA 
1983 P 1.1 in 103 50.000 .10 
Cabin Fire Protection FAA 
1985 F 6.5 in 108 15.000 .20 
Passive Restraints/Belts NHTSA 
1984 F 9.1 in 105 1,850.000 .30 
Underground OSHA 
Construction 1989 F 1.6 in 103 8.100 .30 
Alcohol & Drug FRA 
Control 1985 F 1.8 in 106 4.200 .50 
Servicing Wheel Rims OSHA 
1984 F 1.4 in 105 2.300 .50 
Seat Cushion FAA 
Flammability 1984 F 1.6 in 107 37.000 .60 
Floor Emergency FAA 
Lighting 1984 F 2.2 in 108 5.000 .70 
Crane Suspended OSHA 
Personnel Platform 1988 F 1.8 in 103 5.000 1.20 
Concrete & Masonry OSHA 
Construction 1988 F 1.4 in 105 6.500 1.40 
Hazard OSHA 
Communication 1983 F 4.0 in 105 200.000 1.80 
Benzene/Fugitive EPA 
Emissions 1984 F 2.1 in 105 0.310 2.80 
Notes: "Initial Annual Risk" indicates annual deaths per exposed population; an exposed population of 
103 is 1,000, 104 is 10,000, etc. In "Agency Year and Status" column, P, R and F represent proposed, 
rejected and final rule, respectively. 
Sources: W. Kip Viscusi (1992), Fatal Tradeoffs: Public and Private Responsibilities for Risk. New York, Oxford 
University Press. The table is also based on information presented in John F. Morrall, III (1986), "A 
Review of the Record," Regulation, 10:2, p. 30. These statistics were updated byJohn F. Morrall, III, via 
unpublished communication with the author, July 10, 1990. 
the U.S. Department of Transportation, whether as part of the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) or the National Highway and Traffic Safety Administration 
(NHTSA), would pass a benefit-cost test. This strong policy performance is not an 
aberration. The U.S. Department of Transportation is one of the exceptional agen- 
cies that does, in fact, apply benefit-cost analysis in its regulatory efforts. The agency 
has recendly employed an implicit value of life figure just under $3 million, which 
is at the low end of the value of life spectrum, and it refuses to issue any regulations 
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Table 2 
The Cost of Risk-Reducing Regulations That Fail a Benefit-Cost Test 
Cost Per 
Agency Initial Annual Life Saved 
Year and Annual Lives (Millions 
Regulation Status Risk Saved of 1984 $) 
Grain Dust OSHA 
1987 F 2.1 in 104 4.000 5.30 
Radionuclides/Uranium Mines EPA 
1984F 1.4in 104 1.100 6.90 
Benzene OSHA 
1987 F 8.8 in 104 3.800 17.10 
Arsenic/Glass Plant EPA 
1986F 8.0in 104 0.110 19.20 
Ethylene Oxide OSHA 
1984 F 4.4 in 105 2.800 25.60 
Arsenic/Copper Smelter EPA 
1986 F 9.0 in 104 0.060 26.50 
Uranium Mill Tailings Inactive EPA 
1983 F 4.3 in 104 2.100 27.60 
Uranium Mill Tailings Active EPA 
1983 F 4.3 in 104 2.100 53.00 
Asbestos OSHA 
1986 F 6.7 in 105 74.700 89.30 
Asbestos EPA 
1989 F 2.9 in 105 10.000 104.20 
Arsenic/Glass Manufacturing EPA 
1986 R 3.8 in 105 0.250 142.00 
Benzene/Storage EPA 
1984 R 6.0 in 107 0.043 202.00 
Radionuclides/DOE Facilities EPA 
1984 R 4.3 in 106 0.001 210.00 
Radionuclides/Elem. EPA 
Phosphorous 1984 R 1.4 in 105 0.046 270.00 
Benzene/Ethylbenzenol Styrene EPA 
1984 R 2.0 in 106 0.006 483.00 
Arsenic/Low-Arsenic Copper EPA 
1986 R 2.6 in 104 0.090 764.00 
Benzene/Maleic Anhydride EPA 
1984 R 1.1 in 106 0.029 820.00 
Land Disposal EPA 
1988 F 2.3 in 108 2.520 3,500.00 
EDB OSHA 
1989 R 2.5 in 104 0.002 15,600.00 
Formaldehyde OSHA 
1987 F 6.8 in 107 0.010 72,000.00 
Notes: "Initial Annual Risk" indicates annual deaths per exposed population; an exposed population of 
1O0 iS 1,000, 104 iS 10,000, etc. In "Agency Year and Status" column, P, R and F represent proposed, 
rejected and final rule, respectively. 
Sources: W. Kip Viscusi (1992), Fatal Tradeoffs: Public and Private Responsibilities for Risk. New York, Oxford 
University Press. The table is also based on information presented in John F. Morrall, III (1986), "A 
Review of the Record," Regulation, 10:2, p. 30. These statistics were updated byJohn F. Morrall, III, via 
unpublished communication with the author, July 10, 1990. 
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that cost more than that amount for a statistical life saved. Another transportation- 
related regulation by the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) also is quite ef- 
fective in saving lives, with a cost per life saved of $500,000 for alcohol and drug 
control efforts. 
In contrast, the regulations listed in Table 2 would fail a benefit-cost test. 
Clearly, some agencies like the EPA and OSHA are heavily represented among the 
regulations that fail such a test most severely. The difference across agencies high- 
lights an opportunity to promote health and safety. If we could expand the safety- 
related efforts of the U.S. Department of Transportation and utilize the funds that 
would have otherwise been spent on very inefficient job safety and environmental 
regulations, we would save many more lives at less cost. 
Perhaps the most striking aspect of Table 2 is the limited role that has been 
played by the OMB oversight effort. No regulation with a cost per life saved of 
under $142 million per life has ever been rejected by OMB as part of the oversight 
effort (indicated by R in the second column). Remember, agencies can override 
OMB objections by appealing to the absolute character of their legislative mandate. 
In addition, many regulatory efforts are not subject to OMB review. The OMB 
regulatory review process only pertains to new regulations issued by regulatory agen- 
cies; as a result, regulations on the books for many years are exempt from review. 
In other cases, such as the EPA Superfund program, the agency implements regu- 
latory guidelines that are broadly specified in legislation without specifically issuing 
new regulatory policies. This Superfund program, which is devoted to the cleanup 
of hazardous waste, prevents expected cases of cancer at a median cost of $3.6 
billion dollars per expected case (Viscusi and Hamilton, 1996), making it one of 
the least cost-effective government efforts. The OMB regulatory oversight unit has 
no leverage over governmental policies such as this in which no new regulatory 
policies are formally promulgated. 
Regulatory Reform Legislation: An Overview 
A variety of legislative changes have been proposed to remedy these deficien- 
cies and to put risk regulations on sounder statistical footing, including both om- 
nibus bills that would pertain to regulation generally and bills dealing with specific 
areas of regulation.'2 The political economy of these efforts to make regulations 
more efficient is often complex. Business interests presumably benefit from more 
regulatory restraint. However, corporate interests in less regulation are not always 
socially desirable. The beneficiaries of regulation also have mixed interests. Not all 
workers are made better because of excessively stringent job safety regulations. 
12 For examples of omnibus bills, see H.R. 1022 (passed as part of H.R. 9), H.R. 690, H.R. 1923, and S. 
343. For examples of particular bills, see H.R. 1028, which pertains to Superfund, and S. 333, which deals 
with energy risk management. 
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Workers who lose their jobs because of inefficient regulations gain from reforms, 
as do average consumers. The most clear-cut political economy linkage was the 
prominent role of regulatory reform in Representative Gingrich's Contract with 
America. 
These bills differ along a number of dimensions. Most focus exclusively on risk 
and environmental regulations; others also seek to reform more traditional rate 
regulation. The various regulatory reform bills have included a differing but wide 
range of provisions that would increase the requirements placed on the regulatory 
bodies. In some cases, regulatory agencies would be required to undertake retro- 
spective analyses of existing regulations to determine their merits, whereas in others 
the emphasis is only on new regulations. Some bills would also require that agencies 
assess comparative risks for different regulatory policies, establish peer review pan- 
els to evaluate the scientific evidence underlying the regulatory proposal and create 
a formal recognition of the potential for judicial review of the regulatory proposal 
to assess whether the economic merits of the regulation do in fact meet the required 
test of benefits being in excess of the costs. These various institutional requirements 
do not introduce new economic tests that must be met by regulation, but never- 
theless may have a strong impact on the structure of regulations and the speed with 
which regulations can be adopted. The transactions costs of issuing regulations are 
likely to soar under some of the proposals, particularly those that provide for ju- 
dicial tests of economic analyses. This section will focus on the differences and issues 
that are of greatest interest to economists: benefit-cost analysis, performance vs. 
specification standards, the theories of risk-risk analysis, and the science and bias 
of risk assessment. 
Benefit-Cost Analysis 
From the standpoint of many economists, the centerpiece of the proposals for 
regulatory reform is the requirement that benefits of the regulation exceed the 
costs. In its most sweeping form, the requirement for passing a benefit-cost test 
would become a super-mandate, which overrides any possibly conflicting legislative 
guidelines.'3 Without such a super-mandate provision, the reform bills would be of 
little more than symbolic value, for the various reasons discussed earlier. But even 
if there were broad agreement on a super-mandate, exactly how this benefit-cost 
test is specified would be controversial. Under restrictive versions of the legislation, 
benefits are required to exceed costs before a regulation can be issued. These re- 
strictive approaches may also exclude benefits that are judged to be speculative, 
thus limiting the potential range of commodities valued. More open-ended variants 
of the legislation would require that benefits bear a "reasonable relationship to 
costs" or some similarly structured language that falls short of a rigid benefit-cost 
test. 
13 One example of a bill in which there is an exemption for conflicting legislative provisions is S. 343. 
H.R. 1022 would override current legislative mandates. 
128 Journal of Economic Perspectives 
If all consequences of policies could be readily monetized, this distinction 
would not be consequential. However, many outcomes have nonmonetary conse- 
quences for which attaching dollar values remains quite controversial. For example, 
how might one measure the benefits of affirmative action requirements or im- 
proved access for the handicapped? Many of the most controversial issues of valu- 
ation involve the environment: what, for example, is the value to society of an 
endangered species? This value is almost entirely a passive use or nonuse value. 
Quantifying the passive use value of an endangered species might require contin- 
gent valuation survey techniques to elicit society's willingness to pay for preserving 
these species, but this approach is extremely controversial.'4 Since no market cur- 
rently exists for society's value of endangered species, even conceptualizing how an 
individual might express such a valuation or think about this valuation process 
within the context of his or her current resource allocations raises considerable 
difficulties. Indeed, the debate over valuing passive use of environmental and nat- 
ural resource outcomes is so fierce that there were even congressional proposals in 
1995 to prevent agencies from considering such values on the grounds that they 
are too speculative. 
The fact that many environmental outcomes cannot be readily monetized does 
not necessarily imply that they should be ignored. However, once the benefit-cost 
test becomes amended with language to encompass outcomes that cannot be readily 
monetized, the benefit-cost requirement may lose some of its appeal. But even an 
outcome that required a fuzzier benefit-cost test, without trying to monetize all 
benefits, would nevertheless represent a substantial departure from the current 
approach in which agencies have little accountability with respect to balancing at 
all because of their narrow interpretation of their legislative mandates. 
Another possibility is to have legislation that permits agencies to consider 
benefit-cost balancing, but not to require that they show that benefits are in excess 
of the costs. In this instance, the regulatory oversight group at OMB might be 
able to use this structure to monitor regulatory agency actions and promote more 
balanced policies without imposing a formal benefit-cost requirement. 
Performance vs. Specification Standards 
An economic corollary to the desirability of a benefit-cost test is that companies 
should have the flexibility to adopt the least cost means of meeting the risk reduc- 
tion objective specified in the regulation, such as the bubble policy. A performance 
standard would give companies such leeway, whereas a specification standard would 
mandate specific compliance technologies, such as a particular type of guard for 
machinery. 
A relatively large-scale experiment with the performance approach has taken 
place with respect to EPA emissions regulations. The most ambitious of these 
14 See, for example, the symposium on contingent valuation in the Fall 1994 issue of this journal, with 
papers by Portney, Hanemann, and Diamond and Hausman. See also Carson et al. (1994). 
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efforts, in effect, establishes a market for pollution using tradable pollution permits. 
Carlin (1992) has estimated that the more recent tradable permit system saves about 
$1 billion annually in pollution control costs by shifting the burden of pollution to 
sources where pollution can be reduced most cheaply. 
Some of the regulatory reform bills included provisions to promote a 
performance-oriented rather than a technology-forcing approach.'5 These efforts 
have broad support among economists but are subject to two principal objections. 
First, agencies may be better able to monitor compliance with technology-forcing 
standards. In many instances, however, such as the OSHA grain dust standard, it 
has been possible to incorporate flexibility with a standard that can be monitored. 
Second, flexible standards may have political repercussions (Crandall, 1983). If 
companies could meet air pollution requirements by shifting to low sulphur coal 
from the American west rather than installing scrubbers, it would be more cost- 
effective but would adversely affect coal production in West Virginia. Not surpris- 
ingly, West Virginia legislators (notably Senator Byrd) opposed such discretion. 
Risk-Risk Analysis 
Perhaps in part because of the long-term failure of government agencies to 
adopt a balanced benefit-cost approach, economists have developed a series of 
other more limited tests that can be applied to policy. Three variants of this ap- 
proach come under the heading of risk-risk analysis-that is, to compare the risks 
generated by the regulation with the risks reduced by the regulation to determine 
the net risk effects. The basic idea of this methodology is that government regula- 
tions have competing effects and that, even if one's sole concern is with risk levels, 
some regulations may not be desirable. Some thinking from this approach has been 
incorporated into proposed legislation. 
The first type of risk-risk tradeoff is what economists might term moral hazard 
risks but which the regulatory reform legislation has termed "substitution risks."'16 
In his analysis of the effect of seat belts on auto safety, for example, Peltzman (1975) 
hypothesized that drivers would drive faster and become less careful after wearing 
seat belts because the safety benefits from added care had been diminished. His 
empirical evidence suggested that offsetting behavior on the part of drivers may 
have accounted for the very weak effect that seat belts seem to have had on traffic 
safety. Other studies suggest that seat belts may have enhanced driver safety but 
may increase the risks to pedestrians and motorcyclists. However, there is consid- 
erable controversy with respect to the magnitude of the effect (Blomquist, 1988). 
A variant of this moral hazard risk stems from what Viscusi (1984) termed the 
"lulling effect." Consumers may be lulled into a false sense of security by the ex- 
istence of safety mechanisms. In the case of safety caps designed to prevent child 
15 See, for example, S. 291 and S. 343. 
'6 H.R. 1022, for example, includes extensive provisions requiring that agencies recognize substitution 
risks and incorporate them into their analysis. Graham and Wiener (1995) consider a variety of these 
examples, as does Lave (1981). 
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poisonings, there is evidence that parents became excessively lax about access to 
the products once the caps were in place. The result is that there is no significant 
enhancement of the safety of products for which the caps were intended, and there 
was an apparent increase in risks for other risky products as the decrease in parental 
responsibility had apparent spillover effects with respect to safety protections more 
generally. 
A second class of risk-risk analysis begins by noticing that regulatory efforts 
frequently generate new economic activity; for example, perhaps to manufacture 
pollution control devices or remove waste from hazardous waste sites. These risks, 
like most other economic activity, also generate new hazards. Viscusi and Zeckhau- 
ser (1994) show that the occupational risk cost of expenditures is approximately 
3 to 4 percent of total costs, on average. Thus, every time the government incurs 
$100 million in regulatory costs, injuries and deaths created by these expenditures 
will have a total value of $3-4 million. This loss can become consequential in terms 
of assessing the overall attractiveness of the effort, particularly if the regulatory 
policy is extremely ineffective. If one assumes that 4 percent of all costs are fatality 
and injury costs, then there will be $5 million of fatality and injury losses for every 
$125 million in expenditures. Suppose the policy directly saves one statistical life 
for each $125 million in costs. If the implicit value of life is $5 million, then this 
policy will be exactly a break-even proposition in risk terms since it saves and loses 
one statistical life for each $125 million expenditure. For the regulations in Table 
2 for which the cost per life saved exceeds $125 million, the value of the health 
losses directly generated by the regulation will be at least as great as the value of 
the health benefits provided by the regulation. 
A third version of risk-risk analysis provides perhaps the strongest test of reg- 
ulatory attractiveness. Regulatory expenditures, in effect, make society poorer by 
diverting resources that could be used for other purposes, such as food and housing. 
Because there is a link between higher income and longevity, the opportunity costs 
from regulations will impose mortality costs. 
A vivid way to pose the empirical issue here is to determine what level of reg- 
ulatory expenditure will lead to a statistical death. Using data relating international 
mortality rates to income levels, Lutter and Morrall (1994) calculate the expendi- 
ture level per statistical death to be between $9 million to $12 million. Of course, 
assessments such as these raise a variety of concerns, such as disentangling the 
simultaneous nature of the health-mortality linkage, as discussed by Smith, Epp and 
Schwabe (1994) and others. A more fundamental issue is the plausibility of this 
value range. Since evidence suggests that society is willing to spend $3-$7 million 
to save a statistical life, it seems unlikely that an only slightly higher expenditure 
would lead to the loss of a statistical life. It would barely be consistent to, on the 
one hand, be willing to spend, say, $7 million to save a statistical life, if every time 
we spent $9 million there was the loss of a statistical life. If that were the case, life 
saving expenditures would barely be a break-even proposition. 
An alternative approach introduced in Viscusi (1994) gives another way to 
think about the expenditure- level that leads to a statistical death. Instead of an 
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econometric approach, this concept is specifically linked to estimates of the implicit 
value of saving a life. To be more specific, it relies on the insight that the expen- 
diture level that leads to a statistical death equals the implicit value of life divided 
by the marginal propensity to spend on mortality-reducing commodities. Using this 
approach, Viscusi estimated that $50 million in expenditures would lead to the loss 
of a statistical life, which is a number that is more consistent with estimates of the 
amount society is willing to spend to save statistical lives. 
The various approaches of risk-risk analysis are in early stages of development 
and remain controversial. However, as noted earlier, utilization of a risk-risk test 
has been suggested by a federal court judge as well as by a head of the OMB reg- 
ulatory oversight group.'7 These risk-risk tests are only very partial tests of policy 
efficacy. But if benefit-cost analysis is not permitted, then some much weaker test 
can at least help in weeding out the most inefficient regulations. Naturally, the ideal 
outcome is to develop a meaningful overall test of the attractiveness of regulatory 
policies so that it will not be necessary to resort to these more partial policy evalu- 
ation criteria. 
The Science and Bias of Risk Assessment 
Along with benefit-cost analysis, guidelines for risk assessment comprise the 
core of all the regulatory reform proposals. These issues may seem largely scientific, 
but they also pertain to the appropriate economic policy criteria for policy assess- 
ment as well. The issue is whether government agencies should use "conservative" 
risk assessments that pertain to upper bounds, even if these involve unlikely sce- 
narios that might create particularly adverse consequences, or whether they should 
rely instead on unbiased risk assessments pertaining to the mean risk. 
From a statistical decision theory standpoint, if we are concerned with maxi- 
mizing the expected benefits of government efforts, we should rely upon the mean 
risk values in making these assessments rather than some other value along the risk 
distribution. However, the prevailing practice in the federal government is to utilize 
some kind of upper bound for the risk in the interest of "conservatism." This bias 
toward conservatism can intrude upon the risk assessment to a considerable extent 
(Nichols and Zeckhauser, 1986) because it is typically manifested on a parameter 
by parameter basis, not simply by selecting the 95th percentile of the overall risk 
distribution. Thus, in the case analysis of Superfund risks from groundwater con- 
tamination, the agency uses the maximum concentration of the chemical found at 
the site and an upper bound value of four other parameters to calculate the risk. 
The result is that the sequence of conservative assumptions is compounded, so that 
the overall degree of conservatism is much greater. Indeed, in the case of 
17 See in particular UAW v OSHA, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
89-1559 and the letter fromJames MacRae, Acting Administrator, Office of Information and Regulatory 
Affairs to Nancy Risque-Rohrbach, Assistant Secretary for Policy, U.S. Department of Labor, Washington, 
D.C., September 16, 1992. 
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Superfund, the estimated risk values are well beyond the 99th percentile of the 
overall risk distribution (Vi-scusi and Hamilton, 1996). 
It is probably impossible for policymakers to ascertain the degree of conser- 
vative bias. The extent of the bias varies according to agency and even according 
to the particular policy action within each agency. Since government analysts do 
not typically report the lower bound or the mean risk assessment, policymakers 
have no sense of the true risk, only what might prevail under a worst case scenario. 
Virtually all the regulatory reform bills would require that the agency report some 
type of mean or central tendency of the risk. If agencies choose to report an upper 
bound, the bills would also require them to report a lower bound so that policy 
analysts can assess the range of risk and scientific opinion. 
This controversy relates more generally to the economic problems arising with 
respect to risk ambiguity. The well-known Ellsberg paradox (1961), for example, 
demonstrated that individuals have a preference for precise opportunities of win- 
ning a prize. In particular, how do people react to "hard" probabilities, such as 
those based on detailed objective evidence as opposed to "soft" probabilities that 
are subjectively determined relying primarily on individual judgment? A rational 
decision maker should be indifferent to a lottery that offers a "hard" 0.5 probability 
of a prize to a lottery that offers a "soft" 0.5 probability that is known with less 
precision; for example, people prefer choosing a black or white ball from an urn 
where the proportion of balls is known to be half and half, rather than choosing 
from an urn where they do not know the proportion of balls and thus must make 
a rational default assumption that the chance of drawing a black or white ball is 
50:50. People generally prefer the lottery for which the probability is known with 
precision. In the loss dimension, the counterpart result is that people are averse to 
ambiguous chances of harms, including those from environmental damage (Vis- 
cusi, 1992). This anomaly does not arise because of risk aversion. Rather, there is 
aversion to imprecisely defined probabilities, which is one of the classic contradic- 
tions of economic rationality. One possible explanation for the conservatism bias 
is that government agencies have institutionalized the ambiguity aversion bias in 
decisionmaking through their risk assessment practices. 
From a policy standpoint, providing a fuller statistical characterization 
could eliminate potential distortions in regulatory priorities. Suppose that for 
Policy A the risk of cancer is 59 per million and that this probability is known 
with precision, whereas with Policy B the scientists are evenly divided as to 
whether the risk is zero or 60 per million. Their mean risk assessment is 30 per 
million. Current risk assessment practices would summarize the risk levels based 
solely on the upper bound values, giving Policy B a higher risk ranking even 
though its mean value is about half that of Policy A, and its upper bound value 
is almost the same as the risk for Policy A that is known with precision. The result 
is that agencies tilt policy priorities toward risks that are least precisely under- 
stood rather than those risks for which the expected benefits to society from 
regulation are the greatest. Legislation to change this treatment of uncertainty 
could save a greater expected number of lives. 
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Conclusion 
The controversy over the regulatory reform legislation is really over the prac- 
tical applicability of economic principles. In the abstract, it is difficult (at least for 
an economist) to disagree with benefit-cost analysis. But in practice, what provision 
should be made for benefits that cannot be quantified? Must all benefits and costs 
be monetized? Should estimation of risks be delegated to scientists? Is there a le- 
gitimate role for the public to play in deciding whether these risk estimates should 
be taken from the conservative edge of existing estimates or from the mainstream? 
The policy debate over applying benefit-cost analysis has been further clouded be- 
cause the bills include a myriad of institutional reforms that would affect the process 
of issuing regulation and could often lead to additional delays, such as the estab- 
lishment of peer review panels and judicial review. 
Almost since the inception of the risk and environmental agencies in the early 
1970s, there has been a continuing concern with ensuring that regulations yield 
societal benefits commensurate with their costs. This recognition of the need for 
balance, in turn, has led policymakers to seek a greater role for economists, and 
the principles of economic analysis undoubtedly will continue to play a central role 
in the debate over the future of regulatory policy. 
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